Parting the Dark Money Sea: Exposing Politically Active Tax-Exempt Groups Through FEC-IRS Hybrid Enforcement by Miller, Carrie E.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 57 | Issue 1 Article 7
Parting the Dark Money Sea: Exposing Politically
Active Tax-Exempt Groups Through FEC-IRS
Hybrid Enforcement
Carrie E. Miller
Copyright c 2015 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Carrie E. Miller, Parting the Dark Money Sea: Exposing Politically Active Tax-Exempt Groups Through
FEC-IRS Hybrid Enforcement, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 341 (2015), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
wmlr/vol57/iss1/7
PARTING THE DARK MONEY SEA: EXPOSING POLITICALLY
ACTIVE TAX-EXEMPT GROUPS THROUGH FEC-IRS HYBRID
ENFORCEMENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
I. TAX LAW AND ELECTION LAW FOUNDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
A. Internal Revenue Code Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
1. Section 501(c)(4) Social Welfare Organizations . . . . . . 347
2. Section 527 Political Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
B. Campaign Finance Doctrinal Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
1. Statutory Basis and Underlying Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
2. Evolving Case Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
II. ESCALATING POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF TAX-EXEMPT 
SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS: WHERE TAX LAW AND 
ELECTION LAW INTERSECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
A. IRS Treatment of Political Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
1. Conflicting Threshold Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
2. Vague Definitional Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
B. Section 501(c)(4) Organizations Have Emerged as the 
Preferred Campaign Finance Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
1. Increased Independent Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
2. Relaxed Reporting Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
3. The Coordination Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
C. Deregulation’s Impact on Values that Support 
Campaign Finance Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
III. PROPOSAL: FEC-IRS HYBRID ENFORCEMENT, ENHANCED 
BY INTERNAL AGENCY REFORMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
A. Internal Agency Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
1. Filing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
2. Earmarked Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
3. Combatting the Daisy Chain Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
341
342 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:341
B. Cooperative Regulation: Pooling Together Tax and 
Election Enforcement Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
2015] EXPOSING POLITICALLY ACTIVE TAX-EXEMPT GROUPS 343
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) grants tax exemptions to non-
profit entities organized under § 501(c)(4), and in exchange, restricts
these groups to a “social welfare” purpose.1 Such a restriction limits
how much political activity § 501(c)(4) organizations can fund.2
Engaging in political action necessarily involves the Federal
Election Commission (FEC), the Agency founded to enforce the
federal election laws (campaign finance restrictions in particular),3
and so there is an unavoidable intersection of tax law and election
law when these tax-exempt groups participate in partisan activity.
This Note aims to improve the system designed to regulate this
overlapping area of the law by pooling the respective powers of the
IRS and the FEC. The collaborative framework proposed herein
presents an opportunity for an enhanced regulatory landscape, in
which the two Agencies work better together than either can alone. 
Consider the following examples of the murky campaign finance
world, where funding sources are obscured and the true messages
of campaigns are confused. In the 2010 election, the § 501(c)(4)
organization Commission on Hope, Growth, and Opportunity ran a
series of television advertisements with cartoon depictions of prom-
inent Democrats, including President Obama and Representative
Nancy Pelosi, dancing in a conga line and “living it up” in Washing-
ton.4 The ads called on viewers to “join” the Republicans, whom the
Commission presumably viewed as more viable candidates.5 This
message likely appeared partisan for many viewers—a call to action
for Republican voters—but the Commission did not register as a
political committee or report any political spending to the FEC. The
group also declared no political spending to the IRS, despite listing
1. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2014); see infra Part I for a description of the statutory scheme that
applies to politically active exempt groups.
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/pages/
brochures/fecfeca.shtml [http://perma.cc/Z9SQ-QUBP] (last updated Jan. 2015).
4. Kim Barker, How Nonprofits Spend Millions on Elections and Call it Public Welfare,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 18, 2012, 11:25 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-nonprofits-
spend-millions-on-elections-and-call-it-public-welfare [http://perma.cc/V9QB-3FGU].
5. See id.
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on its tax return that 96 percent of its total expenditures ($4.6 mil-
lion) were on advertisements like the one described.6 
In the 2014 North Carolina Senate race, the Iowa-based § 501(c)(4)
American Future Fund (AFF) launched a series of online advertise-
ments endorsing libertarian candidate Sean Haugh and praising
him for supporting marijuana legalization.7 AFF did report the
expenditures to the FEC,8 but more significant here is the confusion
such an advertisement creates. AFF actually supported Republican
candidate Thom Tillis, but the point of the ad was to portray Haugh
as the best choice for “progressive values”—a preferable alternative,
then, to Democrat incumbent Kay Hagan. The ads also provided a
new slogan for Haugh—“More weed, less war”—which his campaign
did not approve.9 To the average North Carolina voter, it may have
appeared that Haugh, or a group supporting Haugh, paid for or
approved of the advertising. The true story, however, reveals that
without stricter guidelines, independent political spending can and
does skew campaign messaging.
Various proposed means of campaign finance reform, such as
broader disclosure requirements10 and more nuanced contribution
restrictions,11 may, in the long term, correct the problems illustrated
6. See id. The Commission, similar to the Republican Jewish Coalition, see infra notes
146-52 and accompanying text, reported no intent to engage in political activity on its
application for exempt status but then spent nearly all of its funds on campaign intervention.
John Spratt, former Chairman of the House Budget Committee, said of his defeat, “I still don’t
know who they are .... It’s a classic case [of a secret organization].” Jonathan Weisman, Tax-
Exempt Group’s Election Activity Highlights Limits of Campaign Finance Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(July 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/us/politics/hope-growth-and-opportunity-
shows-limits-of-disclosure-rules.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/T8HY-MCQB].
7. Alex Roarty, GOP Group Urges Young Voters to Support Weed Candidate, NAT’L J.
(Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/koch-allied-group-urges-young-voters-
to-support-weed-candidate-20141021 [http://perma.cc/MKP9-LEJY]. In a likely effort to target
young, left-leaning voters, the AFF ran the ads on various online platforms, including video
site Hulu. Id.
8. See 2014 Senate Independent Expenditures, FEC, http://fec.gov/disclosureie/ienational.
do?candOffice=S [http://perma.cc/6DHU-GBM9] (click map for “North Carolina” then search
“Candidate Name” for “Haugh” then follow “Submit” hyperlink).
9. See Roarty, supra note 7.
10. See infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Joel M. Gora, Free Speech, Fair Elections, and Campaign Finance Laws: Can
They Co-Exist?, 56 HOW. L.J. 763, 784 (2013) (“[O]ne of the main reasons we are witnessing
[these developments] is precisely because we have imposed limits on the ability of individuals
and groups to contribute directly to candidates and parties.... It might be far better for
accountability and transparency in our political system to think about raising or even
2015] EXPOSING POLITICALLY ACTIVE TAX-EXEMPT GROUPS 345
above. The grave lack of enforcement in this area, though, allows
current abuses of both the tax and electoral systems to continue.
Despite the Supreme Court’s recent stripping away of campaign
finance restrictions, this Note operates under the presumption that
some regulation of tax-exempt organizations’ political speech is
constitutionally permissible under the First Amendment12— regula-
tion which is indispensable to fulfilling Congress’s wish for robust
and fair elections.13 A more immediately powerful solution, and
what this Note proposes, is to ramp up enforcement by empowering
both the IRS and the FEC to make internal changes and then coop-
erate to hold politically active social welfare organizations respon-
sible when they violate the tax and election laws. Only if both
Agencies work together will they be able to fulfill their respective
obligations and prevent corruption and exploitation of the electoral
and tax systems. 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I compares and contrasts
the tax code provisions that apply to politically active tax-exempt
groups. It also traces the recent evolution of the Supreme Court’s
First Amendment election law jurisprudence. Citizens United v.
eliminating those contribution limits so that the funding would be back inside the tents of the
parties and the candidates, and they would be responsible for its use.”).
12. See Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and
Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 891 n.84, 893-94, 903-04 (2011) (“[A] failure to subsidize does not,
in and of itself, constitute a burden and does not infringe the [First Amendment] right.... [In
addition,] economic hardship resulting from a denial of government benefits does not neces-
sarily implicate the Constitution, even when First Amendment protections are affected.”)
(citations omitted). The Court has struck down laws that prohibit anonymous speech by
requiring speaker disclosure. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459
U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). But
these cases involved protecting speakers from threats and harassment, which may justify an
exception from a disclosure regime. See Brown, 459 U.S. at 101-02; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462-
63; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (remarking that political speech
regulations, such as disclosure requirements, “would be unconstitutional as applied” to
organizations only if “there were a reasonable probability that the group’s members would
face threats, harassment, or reprisals”) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 198 (2003));
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976). More recently, the Court recognized that “[r]equiring
people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without which
democracy is doomed.” Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 228 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 367.
13. See Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972) (prior to amendments) (“AN ACT[:] To promote fair practices in the conduct of election
campaigns for Federal political offices.”).
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FEC is the hallmark case, but other doctrinal decisions have also
added to the enormous influx of undisclosed independent spending,
referred to as “dark money.” Part II explains how social welfare
organizations have been pushed to the forefront of the campaign
finance debate and addresses weaknesses in the tax code that allow
for abuse. Because political activity that § 501(c)(4) groups engage
in is treated more leniently than that which § 527 groups engage in,
§ 501(c)(4)s have become an ideal, and indeed preferred, mouthpiece
for wealthy donors with special interests. 
Part III proposes a way forward: administrative alterations that
can facilitate effective enforcement of current regulations. Providing
for stricter enforcement by enabling the FEC and IRS to work to-
gether would cut through some of the debilitating FEC gridlock and
truly empower the IRS to hold organizations responsible for abusing
the tax code. There is no stopping money from entering politics, but
rigorous enforcement can help control its effects in future elections.
I. TAX LAW AND ELECTION LAW FOUNDATIONS
Incorporated entities face graduated tax rates under the current
regime, ranging from 15 percent to 35 percent depending on annual
income.14 In order to encourage certain social-minded activities,
though, Congress has exempted from the corporate tax scheme or-
ganizations that make no profit and exist for the public good.15 With
some exceptions, § 501 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) cap-
tures the full range of exempted conduct, which includes charitable
pursuits like churches and schools,16 as well as labor unions,17 trade
associations,18 and social welfare groups.19 This Note focuses on
activity by social welfare groups, § 501(c)(4) organizations, because
they have become the corporate form of choice for entities wishing
to participate in political speech.20 This Part first describes the
incongruent provisions that apply to politically active tax-exempt
14. I.R.C. § 11(b)(1) (2014). 
15. See, e.g., id. §§ 501(c), 527. 
16. Id. § 501(c)(3).
17. Id. § 501(c)(5). 
18. Id. § 501(c)(6).
19. Id. § 501(c)(4).
20. See infra Part II.
2015] EXPOSING POLITICALLY ACTIVE TAX-EXEMPT GROUPS 347
entities and then traces recent election law developments in this
area. 
A. Internal Revenue Code Provisions
A basic understanding of the differing rules that apply to tax-
exempt entities helps reveal why § 501(c)(4) organizations have
become “the keys to the political kingdom.”21 The I.R.C. includes a
separate, express provision, § 527, for organizations that engage in
partisan political activity.22 Despite Congress’s intention that po-
litical groups organize themselves under § 527,23 § 501(c)(4) groups
have become the political speech vehicle of choice.24 Most important-
ly, although entities organized under both sections engage in “polit-
ical activity,” § 527 political groups and § 501(c)(4) social welfare
groups are held to drastically different definitions and standards.25
1. Section 501(c)(4) Social Welfare Organizations
Section 501(c)(4) groups get their moniker directly from the text
of the I.R.C., which states that these organizations should be “op-
erated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare ... the net
earnings of which are devoted exclusively to [these] purposes.”26
Social welfare groups are designed to be issue advocacy groups
focused on a particular policy area, and are permitted to conduct
unlimited lobbying efforts in support of their public-minded
missions. Increasingly, though, these organizations have become
involved in elections, participating in partisan political activity,
which does not honor their exempt purpose.27
21. Douglas Oosterhouse, Note, Campaign Finance Reform and Disclosure: Stepping-Up
IRS Enforcement as a Remedial Measure to Partisan Deadlock in Congress and the FEC, 65
RUTGERS L. REV. 261, 263 (2012).
22. I.R.C. § 527.
23. See infra note 79.
24. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text; infra Part II.
25. The IRS has considered issuing a unified definition of “political activity” but has yet
to act. See Hillary Flynn & Rachael Bade, IRS May Broaden Rule to Police Political
Nonprofits, POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2015, 8:20 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/irs-may-
broaden-rule-to-police-political-nonprofits-116206.html [http://perma.cc/LGP7-D2RH].
26. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
27. See infra Part II.A for deeper discussion of this issue.
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Social welfare groups face few functional and procedural require-
ments. Unlike some tax-exempt organizations, § 501(c)(4)s do not
have to notify the IRS of their formation, nor are they required to
apply for exempt status.28 There is but one filing requirement: social
welfare organizations must provide an informational tax return
(Form 990) to the IRS, which lists some donor information and
expenditures, as well as donations to other tax-exempt groups.29 
Of course, even this requirement is not without a loophole. The
Form 990 is due by the fifth month following the end of the tax year,
so depending on their date of formation, social welfare groups may
take advantage of an eighteen-month delay in filing.30 Augmenting
this already prolonged interval, organizations can request exten-
sions, pushing the filing deadline past twenty-two months after
formation.31 Because these groups are not required to file anything
when they organize, the IRS may not even know a tax-exempt social
welfare organization exists until twenty-two months after it forms,
and by then, it may have disbanded. As discussed in Part III, this
lax reporting structure is problematic when accounting for political
spending, particularly because the IRS is tasked with enforcing
already vague restrictions.
The IRS also requires little public disclosure from social welfare
organizations.32 Although each Form 990 is made publicly available,
either posted online or issued by request, the organization may
redact the donor list it contains before public release.33 As discussed
below, organizing under § 527 as a political organization results in
a very different regulatory scheme—even when participating in the
same political activity that § 501(c)(4) groups engage in.
28. See Oosterhouse, supra note 21, at 266-68; Donald B. Tobin, FAQs on 501(c)(4) Social
Welfare Organizations, THE OHIO STATE UNIV. MORITZ COLL. OF LAW (May 20, 2013), http://
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/analysis/documents/FAQs%20on%20501(c)(4)%20Social
%20Welfare%20Organizations%20v.6.pdf [http://perma.cc/FY3N-C6VS]. Compare I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(4), with I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), and I.R.C. § 527.
29. See Oosterhouse, supra note 21, at 266-68; Tobin, supra note 28.
30. See Oosterhouse, supra note 21, at 268; Tobin, supra note 28.
31. See Tobin, supra note 28.
32. Many reformers consider disclosure to be the one remaining constitutional campaign
finance regulation. For a full discussion of this topic, see infra Part II.B.
33. See Tobin, supra note 28. See generally supra note 12. 
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2. Section 527 Political Organizations
Congress also provided a tax exemption in the I.R.C. for bodies
that are organized specifically for political involvement.34 These
groups, exempt under § 527, can engage in unlimited political activ-
ity but, as a result, are very limited in other activities.35 This tax
classification includes all types of political committees: candidate
and party committees, traditional Political Action Committees
(PACs), leadership PACs (those tied to a particular candidate or
elected official), and Super PACs (those that coordinate with other
PACs).36
Although both § 501(c)(4)s and § 527s engage in political activity,
the IRS requirements imposed on § 527 groups are much stricter
and more comprehensive than those that apply to § 501(c)(4) organ-
izations. Political entities must essentially “account for every dollar
in and every dollar out”37 through detailed and frequent disclosure
reports.38 Unless required to register as a political committee with
the FEC,39 § 527 groups must report to the IRS all expenditures
made over $500 and all contributions received over $200.40 Regard-
less of which agency the § 527 entity files with, this financial infor-
mation is publicly available online.41 In order to function legally,
§ 527 groups must also notify the IRS of their formation and
operation.42 The full significance of these discrepancies is explored
34. See I.R.C. § 527 (2014).
35. See id.
36. See Oosterhouse, supra note 21, at 265-66.
37. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and
Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure
Laws, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL’Y 59, 73 (2011).
38. Oosterhouse, supra note 21, at 266.
39. See FEC Filing Required for Some 527 Organizations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/
Charities-&-Non-Profits/Political-Organizations/FEC-Filing-Required-for-Some-527-
Organizations [http://perma.cc/247N-CP93] (last updated Feb. 4, 2014). 
40. See FAQs About the Annual Form Filing Requirements for Section 527 Organizations,
IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Political-Organizations/FAQs-about-the-
Annual-Form-Filing-Requirements-for-Section-527-Organizations [http://perma.cc/JQY9-
7TX5] (last updated June 10, 2015) (follow “Periodic Reports of Contributions and Expendi-
tures” then follow “Contents of Report” hyperlink).
41. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 73, 82.
42. Form 8871 Initial Notice, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Political-
Organizations/Initial-Notice-Form-8871 [http://perma.cc/QP2N-WNYA] (last updated July 21,
2015).
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in Part II.B. Importantly, although § 501(c)(4) organizations are still
free to engage in political activity by establishing and acting through
an affiliated § 527 group,43 they were, until recently, required to do
so.44
B. Campaign Finance Doctrinal Framework
The complications detailed in this Note are typically traced to
Citizens United v. FEC, but other cases have also contributed.
Although Citizens United did have a profound impact on subsequent
elections,45 the influence of the decisions discussed here should not
be understated. They demonstrate the Court’s evolving First
Amendment election law jurisprudence and, as a practical matter,
have resulted in social welfare groups’ expanded bank accounts. The
foundational campaign finance regulations, and the cases that
dismantled them, are detailed below.
1. Statutory Basis and Underlying Values
In 1972, Congress passed the first comprehensive campaign fi-
nance law, which provided limits on different types of political
spending.46 After the rise of “soft money”—funds not subject to these
limits contributed to and spent by political parties in federal
elections—Congress amended the law with the 2002 Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which attempted to control the flow
of soft money and the increasing influence of issue ads.47 Some of
BCRA’s provisions have now been repealed,48 but certain restric-
tions and disclosure provisions remain vital campaign finance
regulations.
43. See Oosterhouse, supra note 21, at 268.
44. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336-40 (2010) (“[T]he option to form PACs
does not alleviate the First Amendment problems.”).
45. See infra Part II.B.1.
46. Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30126 (2002)).
47. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
48. See infra Part I.B.2.
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Traditionally, there are four recognized government interests that
drive campaign finance restrictions.49 The most compelling is the
anti-corruption interest: the idea that money corrupts politics gener-
ally, and politicians in particular.50 The other three are: the equality
interest, that voters should enjoy equal access to candidates and
elected officials, and that the majority of political donors are not
representative of the voting public; the participation interest, that
more money, especially if undisclosed, leads to lower voter turnout;
and the information interest, that voters should have as much
information as possible about the speakers behind political mes-
sages.51 As detailed below, the Court has discarded three of these
interests; the anti-corruption rationale remains the one stronghold,
though it has been narrowed in recent years.52 Each of these
rationales, however, is crucial to maintaining a fair and honorable
election system. 
2. Evolving Case Law
The BCRA restrictions were first narrowed in the 2007 case FEC
v. Wisconsin Right to Life, in which a § 501(c)(4) organization chal-
lenged the BCRA “blackout” provisions. BCRA prohibited corporate-
and union-funded electioneering communications (including issue
advocacy and express candidate advocacy) from running close in
time to an election.53 The Court invalidated the blackout periods as
applied to the challenger’s issue advocacy.54 Though a significant
setback for BCRA supporters, the decision dealt an incomplete blow
49. Jocelyn Benson, Saving Democracy: A Blueprint for Reform in the Post-Citizens United
Era, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 723, 726 (2012).
50. See id. at 736-37.
51. See id. at 726, 730, 733.
52. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
53. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 458-60 (2007) [hereinafter WRTL];
see also Galston, supra note 12, at 883-84.
54. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 466-67 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003), and its
predecessor, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1976)); see also Galston, supra note 12, at
889-90. Notably, the facts-and-circumstances test now employed by the IRS is very similar
to the FEC’s intent-and-effect test, which the Court rejected here. Although some scholars
consider issue advocacy to be another form of campaign speech, the Court’s holding rejects the
idea that political speech may be something other than express advocacy. See Galston,
supra note 12, at 888-89. 
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because it upheld the facial constitutionality of the blackout
provision for express advocacy.55 
Three years later, the Court again considered a challenge from a
social welfare organization in a case that many consider defining of
the Roberts Court.56 Here, the § 501(c)(4) group Citizens United
presented fairly narrow and specific questions about political speech
distributed through cable Video-on-Demand services and the related
advertising for that content.57 The case took a turn, though, at oral
argument, where the following exchange occurred:
Mr. Stewart (arguing for the government): [I]f you had Citizens
United or General Motors using general treasury funds to
publish a book that said at the outset, for instance, Hillary
Clinton’s election would be a disaster ... —
Chief Justice Roberts: Take my hypothetical. It doesn’t say at
the outset. It funds ... a discussion of the American political
system, and at the end it says vote for X.
Mr. Stewart: Yes, our position would be that the corporation
could be required to use PAC funds rather than general treasury
funds. 
Chief Justice Roberts: And if they didn’t, you could ban it?
Mr. Stewart: If they didn’t, we could prohibit the publication of
the book using the corporate treasury funds.58
After Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart all but declared the
government could ban books,59 the Court ordered reargument on a
55. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 477-81. Though not a total defeat, Congress originally composed
BCRA to tackle the “twin loopholes” that § 527 organizations had previously enjoyed: the
ability to raise soft money and to release sham issue advertising. Oosterhouse, supra note 21,
at 274-75. The Court completely struck the provision intended to protect only bona fide issue
advocacy, thus undermining one of Congress’s goals. 
56. See Galston, supra note 12, at 871 (referring to the case as a dramatic example of
Roberts Court activism and explaining that “the majority [in Citizens United] overruled two
earlier Supreme Court decisions, invalidated a federal law of long-standing, and, by impli-
cation, invalidated parallel state campaign finance provisions in at least 24 states”); see also
Geoffrey R. Stone, The First Amendment Doesn’t Protect the Right to Buy the American
Government, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 5, 2014, 5:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2014/04/05/the-first-amendment-doesn-t-protect-the-right-to-buy-the-american-government.
html [http://perma.cc/J9B8-GVYT]. 
57. See Brief for Appellant at i, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205).
58. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205).
59. See id.; see also Gora, supra note 11, at 771.
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broader question: whether prior election law decisions, including
those that addressed the constitutionality of the BCRA provisions
and which led to Stewart’s bold statement, should be overturned.60
The Court then struck down BCRA’s ban on corporate-funded
independent expenditures.61
Relying on Citizens United later that same year, the District of
Columbia Circuit solidified “carte blanche”62 for unlimited donations
to political groups in SpeechNow.org v. FEC.63 The opinion protected
disclosure requirements, as the Court had in Citizens United,64 but
banned the contribution caps for donations to independent-expen-
diture-only groups (those with no direct ties to a candidate).65
Organizational power is often tied to the purse strings, so the
SpeechNow decision is possibly the true culprit of the problems
detailed herein, simply made possible by the holdings in Wisconsin
Right to Life and Citizens United.66
There is much dispute about the true significance of these cases,
Citizens United in particular. Some believe the opinion undermines
the First Amendment and democracy as a whole,67 though this
narrative has been described as “overly simplistic.”68 Others find no
constitutional flaws but still fault the case’s outcome for the shift of
political capital to social welfare groups.69 Taken together, these
60. See Order for Reargument, Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009). The Court
specifically requested supplemental briefing by the parties about overruling Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and/or McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003). Id.
61. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365-67.
62. Leah McGrath Goodman, As Dark Money Floods U.S. Elections, Regulators Turn a
Blind Eye, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 30, 2014, 11:03 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/10/10/dark-
money- floods-us-elections-regulators-turn-blind-eye-273951.html [http://perma.cc/XDM5-
R5V7].
63. 599 F.3d 686, 692-96 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
64. 558 U.S. at 371.
65. SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 692-98.
66. See Rick Hasen, What Matt Bai’s Missing in His Analysis of Whether Citizens United
Is Responsible for the Big Money Explosion, ELECTION L. BLOG (July 18, 2012, 10:41 AM),
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=37108 [http://perma.cc/2L8U-AUAT] [hereinafter Big Money
Explosion].
67. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 56.
68. Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the Political Game?, N.Y. TIMES
(July 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-has-citizens-united-
changed-the-political-game.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/BLV9-AQBF].
69. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem with Citizens United: Campaign
Finance, Dark Money, and Shadow Parties, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 903, 907-10 (2014); Richard L.
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holdings boosted formation of and spending by social welfare organi-
zations and Super PACs.70 This Note explores evidence for these
theories and provides a workable solution to such concerns.
Building on the less stringent reporting obligations social welfare
groups face, the next Part reveals why many would prefer operating
through a § 501(c)(4) organization, even when political intervention
is a main focus. And because many social welfare organizations are
not required to register with the FEC, what remains of the cam-
paign finance laws has done little to regulate the troublesome be-
havior highlighted below.
II. ESCALATING POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF TAX-EXEMPT SOCIAL
WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS: WHERE TAX LAW AND ELECTION
LAW INTERSECT
The tax code is not generally regarded for its clarity, and this
characteristic is regrettably no different when situated in the elec-
tion law context. Exempt organizations operate on a type of spec-
trum with respect to political activity. Section 501(c)(3) represents
one end, with an absolute ban on political activity, and § 527 is the
other end, in which the only acceptable purpose is political activi-
ty.71 Regulating § 501(c)(4) groups is particularly challenging
because they fill the middle of this spectrum72 and can act as
Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to Campaign Finance
Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 25-26 (2014) [hereinafter Hasen, Progressive Approaches].
Although Professor Gerken does not blame the case for opening the floodgates of corporate
spending, because, she argues, most corporations avoided the bright-line “magic words” test
with creative issue advocacy anyway, she remains very concerned with the Court’s redef-
inition of corruption and the subsequent and enduring shift in political power, which has
transformed social welfare organizations into “shadow parties.” Gerken, supra, at 907-10.
Professor Hasen has also written extensively on this topic and notably considers the initial
supposition of the Citizens United opinion—that independent spending cannot corrupt the
political process—entirely unfounded. Richard L. Hasen, The Biggest Danger of Super PACs,
CNN (Jan. 9, 2012, 8:13 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/09/opinion/hasen-super-pacs/index.
html [http://perma.cc/56ZY-2HEV] [hereinafter Hasen, Danger].
70. See Debra Erenberg & Matt Berg, The Dark Night Rises: The Growing Role of
Independent Expenditures in Judicial Elections After Citizens United, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
501, 507-12 (2013).
71. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 527 (2014).
72. See id. § 501(c)(4).
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conduits between both one another and § 527s.73 Because of their
unique position, effective enforcement against § 501(c)(4)s requires
a nuanced mix of firmness and flexibility.
A. IRS Treatment of Political Activity
Regulation of political activity has been consistently problematic
for the IRS.74 The IRS’s main purpose is revenue collection, so there
is some institutional discomfort when tax classifications of nonprofit
organizations force the Agency to stray into other areas of law.75
This reluctance can result, as in the case of political involvement, in
two very different and sometimes conflicting legal standards gov-
erning the activities of tax-exempt organizations.76 It is clear that
§ 501(c)(4) organizations are not always sham § 527 groups. It is not
clear, however, where the IRS draws the line that distinguishes the
two and delineates which activities, or how much of them, are
permissible.
1. Conflicting Threshold Standards
According to the I.R.C., § 501(c)(4) entities are to be organized
“exclusively” for the promotion of social welfare and specifically not
for the benefit of private individuals.77 Historic authority suggests
that there should be limits on partisan activities by § 501(c)(4) or-
ganizations, in part because partisan interests are not shared by the
public as a whole, and so partisan activity cuts against the specified
73. This arrangement requires strict accounting to ensure that funds are properly
disbursed, but it is by no means unusual. See infra Part II.B.3 for specific examples of this
problem.
74. Roger Colinvaux, Political Activity Limits and Tax Exemption: A Gordian’s Knot, 34
VA. TAX REV. 1, 3-4 (2014).
75. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 78. The IRS has no institutional interest in the
integrity of elections. Id. Whether the IRS should have such an interest, given the implica-
tions tax status has for political regulation, is beyond the scope of this Note. 
76. Galston, supra note 12, at 867; see also Colinvaux, supra note 74, at 3-4; infra Part
II.A.
77. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (explaining that an entity may not organize under § 501(c)(4) “unless
no part of the net earnings of such entity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual”).
356 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:341
purpose of social welfare organizations.78 From the very beginning,
Congress defined these groups specifically as nonpartisan entities,
in contrast with § 527 organizations, which are formed solely for
political involvement.79 
In 1981, the IRS issued a Revenue Ruling that established that
a § 501(c)(4) group is within its exempt purpose if it is organized
“primarily” for the social welfare, despite the use of “exclusively”
twice in the I.R.C.80 Perhaps displaying its unwillingness to exert
control in a non-tax area, the IRS provided no specific threshold on
other activities that would push a § 501(c)(4) entity away from its
“exclusive,” or even “primary,” purpose as a social welfare organiza-
tion. Although this omission contributes to the confusion surround-
ing political involvement of tax-exempt groups today, it was largely
insignificant at the time, because candidates and parties spear-
headed political activity, and independent expenditures were only
just appearing.81
Because the IRS has failed to provide an enforceable rule regard-
ing what it means for something to be an organization’s “primary”
activity, social welfare groups have been driven to decide their own
limits, opportunistically drawing the line as close to a 50/50 thresh-
old as possible.82 Though internal rules developed in 1987 provide
some guidance, the IRS has been publicly silent on whether such a
standard is appropriate.83 Even at a low threshold, these groups are
78. See Terence Dougherty, Section 501(c)(4) Advocacy Organizations: Political Candidate-
Related and Other Partisan Activities in Furtherance of the Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1337, 1342 (2013).
79. See S. Rep. No. 93-1357, at 30 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7506 (“The
committee expects that, generally, a section 501(c) organization that is permitted to engage
in political activities would establish a separate organization that would operate primarily
as a political organization .... In this way, the campaign-type activities would be taken entirely
out of the section 501(c) organization, to the benefit both of the organization and the
administration of the tax laws.”).
80. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
81. See Gerken, supra note 69, at 906. Professor Gerken describes the 1976 case Buckley
v. Valeo as “the snake in [the] garden of campaign-finance Eden,” marking a shift in
expenditure regulation and an increase in non-candidate activity. Id.
82. See Dougherty, supra note 78, at 1339.
83. Rosenberg’s Rules of Order, which lists numerical percentages with corresponding
quantifiable terms like “exclusively,” primarily,” “substantially,” “de minimis,” and so on, were
publicly released in 2013. See Rosenberg’s Rules, www.taxanalysts.com/www/freefiles.nsf/
Files/EO%20Measurement%20Term%20Definitions.pdf/$file/EO%20Measurement%20
Term%20Definitions.pdf [http://perma.cc/3RHJ-JN7L]. What appears to be the first iteration
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able to spend immense sums of money to influence campaigns—all
without the regulations imposed on § 527 political groups for
similar, and in some cases virtually indistinguishable, actions. The
IRS began an effort to clarify and streamline these definitions in
2013, but the overwhelmingly negative reception to the proposed
rule changes reflects the Agency’s inability to regulate this area on
its own competently.84 
2. Vague Definitional Problem
The IRS also encounters enforcement disputes because its rules
are often over- and under-inclusive regarding what constitutes polit-
ical activity. The IRS released Revenue Rulings in 2004 and 2007 to
help organizations determine whether they are advancing a social
welfare mission or a partisan one.85 Although the IRS issued the
2007 version to clarify its 2004 guidance, the revised Ruling almost
immediately became irrelevant because the Agency released it just
weeks before the Supreme Court announced its opinion in Wisconsin
Right to Life.86 
The two Revenue Rulings lay out a facts-and-circumstances
approach, offering similar discrete lists of factors that “tend to
show”87 political activity. It is uncertain, though, how the IRS ap-
plies the factors and what weight, if any, is assigned to each.88 For
example, generally speaking, voter education activities are not con-
of this internal rubric suggests that an organization “exclusively” engages in an activity if it
allocates 95 percent of its time and other resources for that activity, though a seeming second
iteration equates the meaning of “exclusively” and “primarily” because of § 501(c). See id.
84. See Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related
Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R.
pt. 1). The IRS received a record-high number of comments, and groups of all political leanings
were largely critical of the proposed rule. Carl Hulse, Left and Right Object to I.R.S. Plan to
Restrict Nonprofits’ Political Activity, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/02/13/us/politics/both-sides-object-to-irs-plan-to-restrict-nonprofits-political-activity.html
[http:// perma.cc/949K-9R7L].
85. See Rev. Rul. 04-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328; Rev. Rul. 07-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.
86. The IRS issued the Ruling on June 1, 2007, Rev. Rul. 07-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, and the
Supreme Court followed with its decision on June 25, 2007. WRTL, 551 U.S. 449 (2007). See
supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of WRTL’s impact, notably that it struck regulation of
anything but express advocacy, rendering the 2007 Revenue Ruling, which addressed the
distinctions between express advocacy and other forms of political speech, obsolete. 
87. Rev. Rul. 04-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328.
88. See id.; Rev. Rul. 07-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.
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sidered political activity, nor is expressing a view on a public policy
issue—these activities, then, may be thought to fit comfortably
within a social welfare purpose.89 If, however, a voter education
activity focuses on candidates from only one party, or an advertise-
ment about an issue is explicitly tied to a particular candidate for
office during an election season, the guidelines suggest that under
these circumstances such conduct may be considered political activ-
ity.90 The Revenue Rulings are also sometimes hard to interpret be-
cause they provide vague categories of prohibited behavior, rather
than well-defined lists of acceptable activities.91 
This imprecision is especially salient when determining whether
§ 501(c)(4) organizations should be subject to taxation on certain
activities. These groups enjoy tax exemption for funds used for
activities that reflect their prescribed purpose, but if an entity
organized under § 501(c)(4) uses any funds for activities defined in
§ 52792—that is, for political purposes—then the § 501(c)(4)
organization must pay taxes on those funds.93 With such a loose and
easily manipulated definition of political activity, some groups are
able to circumvent this requirement by claiming their candidate-
related activities are solely for educational or issue-based purposes.
Organizations can also avoid tax liability simply by donating di-
rectly to a § 527 organization.94 Loopholes like this, whereby an or-
ganization can donate funds for political activity in which it cannot
itself participate (at least without some limitation), contribute to the
complexity inherent in regulating the political activity of tax-exempt
groups.95 
89. Rev. Rul. 04-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328; Rev. Rul. 07-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. Per the Revenue
Rulings, voter education activities include, among other undertakings, candidate debates
featuring more than one party, informational pamphlets (which provide basic information
about parties, candidates, and their platforms in order to help voters decide among the op-
tions), and get-out-the-vote campaigns (which are intended to encourage civic participation
regardless of ideological leanings).
90. Rev. Rul. 04-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328; Rev. Rul. 07-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421; see also Colinvaux,
supra note 74, at 16-18. 
91. See Dougherty, supra note 78, at 1339.
92. This includes activities that influence “nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual to any ... public office.” I.R.C. § 527(e)(2) (2014).
93. Id. § 527(f).
94. Oosterhouse, supra note 21, at 268-69.
95. See infra Part III for a discussion of how the IRS could combat this issue.
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The Revenue Rulings have only clouded the standards with which
§ 501(c)(4) organizations must comply. In the now very open elector-
al landscape, social welfare organizations essentially operate as
PACs by independently spending on elections with unclear limits or
controls.96 This confusion has left the I.R.C. and traditional cam-
paign finance regulations open to abuse.97 
B. Section 501(c)(4) Organizations Have Emerged as the Preferred
Campaign Finance Vehicle
Although there are different methods for calculating money in
politics, one trend is clear: independent expenditures have increased
dramatically in post-Citizens United elections. Each cycle has seen
record-high spending overall, but more remarkable is that independ-
ent groups outspent candidates and parties by any measure in the
2010, 2012 and 2014 elections.98 A significant portion of this spend-
ing went undisclosed, either because it was a direct expenditure
from a § 501(c)(4) group (no required disclosures), or because a
disclosing group received (and reported) donations only from non-
disclosing entities, rather than individuals. This situation—in which
organizations take advantage of the gaps left in the current disclo-
sure regime and the original sources of funding are impossible to
96. See Barker, supra note 4; see also Oosterhouse, supra note 21, at 268-69. For instance,
the Nevada-based § 501(c)(4) organization Economy Forward spent nearly $175,000, totaling
99 percent of its reported expenditures, on advertisements that praised Senator Harry Reid
during his 2010 re-election campaign. 
97. See Heather K. Gerken, Wade Gibson & Webb Lyons, Rerouting the Flow of “Dark
Money” into Political Campaigns, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/rerouting-the-flow-of-dark-money-into-political-campaigns/2014/04/03/1517ac6e-
b906-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html [http://perma.cc/5LUR-SQRC].
98. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Races in Which Outside Spending Exceeds Candidate
Spending, 2010 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/
outvscand.php?cycle=2010 [http://perma.cc/7ZFB-Z6W6]; Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Races
in Which Outside Spending Exceeds Candidate Spending, 2012 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/outvscand.php?cycle=2012 [http://perma.cc/
R7MW-52XE]; Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Races in Which Outside Spending Exceeds
Candidate Spending, 2014 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outside
spending/outvscand.php?cycle=2014 [http://perma.cc/DD9K-LGXA]. For the 2010, 2012, and
2014 elections, these reports indicate outside groups topped candidate expenditures in twelve,
thirty-two, and twenty-eight congressional races, respectively. As we move farther from Cit-
izens United, tax-exempt entities are brazenly spending more on political causes, often not in
accordance with the I.R.C.
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reach—is commonly referred to as the daisy chain effect.99 There is
now a real possibility that many § 501(c)(4) organizations are cre-
ated simply to avoid the disclosure provisions imposed on § 527
groups. This permits those seeking to create a politically active tax-
exempt group to choose: register as a § 527 political organization
and face a strict disclosure regime, or organize under § 501(c)(4)
with little paperwork and imprecise restrictions on spending. As
revealed below, that choice has been an easy one. 
1. Increased Independent Expenditures
Two years after Citizens United and SpeechNow, the country
experienced the most expensive election to date—an estimated $6
billion was spent at the federal, state, and local levels.100 Independ-
ent expenditures comprised more than $1 billion of this total,
signaling a dramatic increase after the decisions.101 The Supreme
Court has slowly dismantled campaign finance reforms,102 and since
2010, “any outside group can use corporate money to make a direct
case for who deserves your vote and why, and they can do so right
up to Election Day.”103 
Some claim that campaign finance regulations have had no sway
in decreasing the involvement of independent organizations,104 or if
anything, have increased contributions to outside groups because of
candidate contribution limits.105 This conclusion is questionable,
though, given the decrease in outside spending from 2004 to 2006,
after BCRA’s passage in 2002, and the subsequent increase in the
2008 election, after Wisconsin Right to Life provided the first blow
99. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 87.
100. Erenberg & Berg, supra note 70, at 502.
101. Compare the $1 billion independent expenditures in 2012 with the 2008 figure, $143.6
million—a near tenfold increase. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Outside Spending by Cycle,
Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/
[http://perma.cc/RY8S-W2CM].
102. See supra Part I.B.
103. Bai, supra note 68.
104. Id.
105. Gora, supra note 11, at 784. But if candidate contribution limits force funds to outside
groups, this reinforces the notion that donors intended that the money be used for partisan
involvement and that they gave without regard to the legally specified purpose of the organi-
zation. 
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to BCRA in 2007.106 Additionally, the bulk of independent funds,
and political funds in general, are now spent in the final weeks
before an election—directly in the face of BCRA’s now-defunct
blackout provisions.107 Even those who may consider money’s impact
to be overstated concede that a certain baseline is required to be a
competitive candidate.108 Regardless of how it is counted and cate-
gorized, the fact remains that money affects election outcomes, and
post-election, affects legislative outcomes.109 
An increasing portion of this spending is undisclosed.110 In the
2010 election, § 501(c)(4) groups outspent Super PACs (organized
under § 527) 3-to-2, and seven of the top ten outside spenders were
social welfare groups.111 The numbers are starker when compared
side-by-side. In mid-September 2008, groups that did not fully dis-
close their donors had spent $32 million on advertisements; at the
same point in the 2012 election, this number had ballooned to $135
million.112 
The 2014 midterm election tells the same story. The mid-Sep-
tember mark showed a three-fold increase in the 2014 midterms
compared to the 2010 election.113 In August 2014, the FEC reported
over $50 million in independent spending, and this number jumped
106. See Hasen, Big Money Explosion, supra note 66.
107. See Goodman, supra note 62; infra note 114 and accompanying text.
108. See John Cassidy, Jeb, Hillary, and the Money Primary, NEW YORKER (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/jeb-hillary-money-primary [http://perma.cc/
2FJJ-3ERY] (“[Campaign strategists] worry more about raising less cash than their opponents
and falling behind in the money primary.... ‘All that matters in this first quarter is fund-
raising.’ ” (quoting “veteran G.O.P. operative” and former Bob Dole campaign manager Scott
Reed)); see also Hasen, Progressive Approaches, supra note 69, at 31-32 (discussing the “money
primary”).
109. See Hasen, Progressive Approaches, supra note 69, at 32. As former U.S. Congressman
Steve LaTourette has explained, “I don’t think [independent groups] have to make a [direct]
threat” to obtain a desired legislative result. “One, I think people are smarter than that; two,
it [is] ... implicit in the scorecard.” DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E.B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT
MONEY: OUTSIDE SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 83 (2014).
110. See Benson, supra note 49, at 744.
111. Id.; Conor Dowling & Amber Wichowsky, Why We Should Care About Dark Money Ads,
WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJ. (Oct. 16, 2014), http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/blog/why-we-should-
care-about-dark-money-ads/ [http://perma.cc/67TE-4WK2]; see also Barker, supra note 4.
112. Benson, supra note 49, at 744.
113. Nancy Kaffer, How to Make Campaign Finance Reform Sexy, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 22,
2014, 5:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/22/how-to-make-campaign-
finance-reform-sexy.html [http://perma.cc/39CB-HRT5].
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to over $400 million by the end of October.114 Social welfare organi-
zations spent in record numbers, meaning the American public does
not have the chance to know who spent almost $120 million (a
modest estimate) to influence their votes in 2014,115 often more than
the campaigns themselves. In the 2014 Iowa Senate race, for exam-
ple, candidates spent less than half of what outside groups spent.116
This disparity was represented nationwide in Senate and House
races,117 and many believe the increase in independent spending
impacts House races more, because smaller expenditures can have
a more significant impact at the congressional district level.118 
The increase in independent spending is problematic for two
reasons. First, independent groups are not politically accountable
like candidates and parties; their vitality is not based on their
political decisions. Second, and relatedly, the political involvement
of independent groups has made it much harder for campaigns to
control their messages and the candidates’ image.119 Because so-
called social welfare groups are not politically accountable in the
same way as major parties and candidates, they tend to produce
more negative advertising, focusing their efforts on opposing
114. Matea Gold, Big Spending by Parties, Independent Groups Drowns Airwaves in
Negative Attacks, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/big-
spending-by-parties-independent-groups-drowns-airwaves-in-negative-attacks/2014/10/21/
b4447f66-593c-11e4-b812-38518ae74c67_story.html [http://perma.cc/37V5-8BYA]. “Dark mon-
ey” groups were responsible for at least $130 million of this estimate and likely spent much
more on activities reported as “issue advocacy.” Id.
115. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Outside Spending, Total by Type of Spender, 2014,
OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php [http://perma.cc/
6LKG-ML72]. CRP reported nearly $800 million in non-candidate spending, including over
$340 million from Super PACs and just over $118 million from § 501(c)(4) social welfare
organizations. When spending from unions and trade associations, which also do not disclose
donors, is added to that from social welfare groups, the total undisclosed amount grows past
$160 million. Notably, party spending made up less than one-third of total outside spending,
at around $234 million.
116. Compare Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2014 Outside Spending, by Race, OPENSECRETS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=R [http://perma.cc/9UW3-U3UJ]
(revealing over $61 million spent by outside groups), with Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Total
Raised and Spent 2014 Race: Iowa Senate, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/races/
candidates.php?cycle=2014&id=IAS2&spec=N [http://perma.cc/4ZAT-MSZV] (indicating the
two major party candidates, winner Joni Ernst (R) and incumbent Bruce Braley (D), together
spent just over $24 million).
117. See Gold, supra note 114.
118. See Bai, supra note 68; Hasen, Danger, supra note 69. 
119. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
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candidates rather than supporting them.120 Part of the rise in
spending can be explained simply because the number of § 501(c)(4)
groups has increased, but this proliferation only solidifies the point
that such organizations are now the preferred election finance vehic-
le, founded for political activity in contravention of the I.R.C. 
Some claim that increased independent spending is not a problem
because it levels the electoral playing field.121 For example, in the
2012 presidential election, the two major party candidates and their
respective parties each spent a little under $1 billion.122 But outside
spending on both sides exceeded $100 million, and in the case of
independent conservative groups, nearly matched candidate spend-
ing.123 When special interest spending comes close to outpacing, or
even matching, a presidential candidate’s own campaign expendi-
tures, it should be no comfort that aggregate spending is equivalent.
As referenced above, such financial influence results in outside
groups enjoying immense political capital with voters, minus the
restraint of political accountability.
2. Relaxed Reporting Provisions
Presumably the main reason politically-minded groups choose to
file under § 501(c)(4) is because of the lower disclosure provisions to
which such organizations are subject.124 Although it is unclear
whether any amount of political activity is consistent with the
purpose of § 501(c)(4),125 many of these groups are formed specifi-
cally to work with Super PACs and to engage in independent politi-
cal spending, rather than social welfare activities.126 Indeed, based
on their FEC reports, it seems some § 501(c)(4) groups use their
whole budgets for political expenses.127 Those funds are often
120. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
121. See Gora, supra note 11, at 782.
122. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Presidential Race, OPENSECRETS, http://www.
opensecrets.org/pres12 [http://perma.cc/RK59-AGDP].
123. See id. 
124. See Colinvaux, supra note 74, at 22-26; Dougherty, supra note 78, at 1339-41; supra
Part I.A.
125. See supra Part II.A.
126. See Dougherty, supra note 78, at 1341-42. There is some concern that § 501(c)(4) is
being corrupted to promote only private interests. See infra note 240.
127. See supra notes 6, 96 and accompanying text; infra note 215 and accompanying text.
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reported to the IRS as having been used for “educational activities”
so that these groups can retain their exempt status.128
Public disclosure of political donors has remained a valid cam-
paign finance regulation,129 in part because it “enables the electorate
to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different
speakers and messages.”130 As discussed above, § 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions must report to the IRS donors who give more than $5000, but
they do not have to make this information public.131 In contrast,
§ 527 political groups must publicly disclose donors and, in some
way, account for every dollar contributed and spent.132 If they refuse
to comply with these requirements, § 527s must pay corporate tax
on those funds and may risk losing their tax-exempt status alto-
gether.133 This system sufficiently encourages disclosure, though
some PACs have chosen to pay the penalty rather than disclose.134
Certain political activities do trigger FEC reporting for all actors,
including § 501(c)(4) organizations, but these requirements are
largely ineffective at capturing actual political expenditures because
they cover only specifically earmarked donations. For example, once
a social welfare organization has spent more than $10,000 in a
calendar year for electioneering communications (“express advocacy”
regarding a candidate), it must file Form 9 with the FEC, which in-
cludes a list of donors who gave $1000 or more for the purpose of
those communications.135 Similarly, once a group spends $250 on
independent expenditures (those made absent coordination with
candidates and parties) in a calendar year, it must file an itemized
list for each expenditure, as well as quarterly reports of all dona-
128. See infra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
130. Dowling & Wichowsky, supra note 111. Disclosure requirements should be easier to
comply with now more than ever because of electronic reporting. 
131. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 81.
132. See supra Part I.A.
133. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 85-86.
134. See Benson, supra note 49, at 744. IRS donor disclosure is also not without challenge.
The § 501(c)(4) group Campaign for Liberty, associated with former Representative Ron Paul,
has refused to provide donor disclosure and to pay any fines the IRS would impose. Joel
Gehrke, Ron Paul Group to Defy IRS, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 15, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://
washingtonexaminer.com/ron-paul-group-to-defy-irs/article/2547261 [http://perma.cc/JY77-
6ETB].
135. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 73-74 nn.66-72.
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tions over $200 given for those expenditures.136 Politically active
groups can therefore avoid such reporting by raising general funds,
with no restricted or designated uses.
Some have suggested reforming these regulations to force robust
disclosures, perhaps by requiring a public list of top funders137 or a
disclaimer at the end of a group’s advertisements stating that it
does not disclose donors,138 or by passing a constitutional amend-
ment.139 Federal election law, after all, strongly favors disclosure
obligations, because it holds political actors accountable, minimizes
false information, provides cognitive shortcuts, and reveals informa-
tion about financial supporters.140 Nonetheless, there are always
privacy concerns when making certain information available to the
public, so how disclosure is structured is crucial in determining
whether it is effective, appropriate, and constitutional.141 Disclosure
reform has been deliberated at length elsewhere,142 and it may be a
complicated path because social welfare groups do have some FEC
reporting obligations and, more importantly, because the Supreme
Court has historically protected § 501(c)(4) donor lists from the
public.143 Traditional tax law also places limits on what information
is made publicly available.144 Any new disclosure requirements
imposed on § 501(c)(4) groups will have to be appropriately tailored
to include only donors whose dollars were used for political expendi-
tures, as opposed to legitimate issue advocacy, and regulators may
face the same definitional and earmarking shortcomings discussed
136. See id. at 75 nn.75-78.
137. Id. at 87.
138. Gerken, Gibson & Lyons, supra note 97.
139. See DISCLOSE Act (S.2516) and the Need for Expanded Public Disclosure of Funds
Raised and Spent to Influence Federal Elections: Hearing on S. 2516 Before the S. Comm. on
Rules & Admin, 113th Cong. (2014); Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on
Spending in Elections Act, HR. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010).
140. See Benson, supra note 49, at 746; see also Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 62-63;
Dowling & Wichowsky, supra note 111.
141. See Benson, supra note 49, at 747; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Politics, and
Privacy, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 812-14 (2012); see also Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37,
at 71-72.
142. See, e.g., Benson, supra note 49, at 743-47 (outlining the benefits of disclosure and
explaining how it serves the fundamental values); Colinvaux, supra note 74, at 6-7, 11-23
(discussing the challenges of imposing restrictions on tax-exempt groups); Torres-Spelliscy,
supra note 37, at 64-65 (urging the IRS to adopt robust disclosure requirements).
143. See supra note 12.
144. See Mayer, supra note 141, at 806-07.
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above. The disclosure solution may also fall short, as Professor
Richard Hasen has explained, because it is “a poor substitute for
more serious and effective campaign regulation.”145 
There is some evidence that groups gamble with their exempt
status, betting on a lack of IRS enforcement.146 Consider the Repub-
lican Jewish Coalition (RJC), a § 501(c)(4) organization. In its appli-
cation to the IRS, the RJC indicated it planned to engage in no
political activity.147 Leading up to the 2012 election, however, the
RJC hosted a meeting where it played advertisements that attacked
President Obama’s policies and then described a plan to help the
election of Republican challenger Mitt Romney.148 The RJC solicited
donations after this presentation, reminding donors that, because
the RJC is organized under § 501(c)(4), they would be shielded from
public disclosure.149 The group reported to the FEC more than $1
million spent on political advertisements, but its Form 990 for the
same year showed no direct political expenditures.150 The RJC did
list nearly $4 million in contributions to other politically active tax-
exempt groups, suggesting that the RJC may have also funded
political activity that was not reported to the FEC.151 Even if the
organizations receiving RJC’s donations did report to the FEC,
though, the daisy chain effect would come into play, and the original
donor to the RJC would be able to avoid disclosing. Other social
welfare organizations have also reported incongruent amounts of
political spending to the IRS and the FEC, indicating a significant
disconnect between the regulatory requirements and policies of the
two Agencies.152 
Arguably at the center of this controversy is Crossroads Grass-
roots Policy Strategies (Crossroads GPS), which operates as a
§ 501(c)(4) organization affiliated with the § 527 group American
145. Hasen, Progressive Approaches, supra note 69, at 21.
146. Barker, supra note 4. In a survey of § 501(c)(4) filings, nearly half of the groups listed
no intent to impact elections on the initial application but later reported political spending






152. Id. For example, in its FEC filing, the § 501(c)(4) Center for Individual Freedom
reported spending $2.5 million on advertisements for the 2010 election, but on its tax return,
the group reported only issue-based educational and legislative activities. Id.
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Crossroads. For the 2012 presidential race, the groups announced
that together they would spend $200 million to support the election
of Mitt Romney.153 This is problematic because the groups are
supposed to serve two distinct tax-exempt purposes—political activ-
ity and social welfare activity—and thus maintain two distinct
financial tallies of those activities. The announcement suggests that
once Crossroads GPS reached its political activity limit (however
that is defined), American Crossroads could step in to finish the job.
So even when they remain independent from candidates, cam-
paigns, and parties, social welfare groups can flout the spirit of the
tax restrictions and engage in inventive accounting to keep their
expenditures in check. More disconcerting, though, is evidence of so-
called independent groups tracking and supporting candidate and
party strategies.
3. The Coordination Problem
By striking the corporate expenditure ban, the Court has greatly
expanded the range of activities in which § 501(c)(4) organizations
can engage without expanding the ability of the government to track
such activities. These groups can now basically operate as PACs, at
least for 49.9 percent of the time, and work together to hide their do-
nors by utilizing the daisy chain effect. This expansion also presents
the problem of coordination, defined for election purposes as
“cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or sug-
gestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee or their
agencies, or a political party committee or its agents.”154 Despite this
seemingly all-encompassing description, “the legal definition of
153. Id. Actual reported expenses for the two groups came to just under $175 million,
though unreported “issue” advertisements might increase the total. See Ctr. for Responsive
Politics, American Crossroads: Independent Expenditures, Communication Costs and Coord-
inated Expenses, Election Cycle 2012, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/
indexpend.php?cmte=C00487363&cycle=2012 [http://perma.cc/LK3F-7GRE]; Ctr. for Respon-
sive Politics, Crossroads GPS: Independent Expenditures, Communication Costs and
Coordinated Expenses, Election Cycle 2012, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/
indexpend.php?cmte=C90011719&cycle=2012 [http://perma.cc/ZMD5-Q7RZ].
154. Coordinated Communications and Independent Expenditures, FEC, http://www.fec.
gov/pages/brochures/indexp.shtml [http://perma.cc/W5GL-45JR] (last updated Jan. 2015).
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prohibited coordination is narrower than the commonsense meaning
of the term,”155 which “allows a great deal of, well, coordination.”156
Unfortunately, in a deficiency this Note hopes to correct, “the
FEC’s enforcement of coordination has made [the definition even]
narrower in practice.”157 The FEC addresses coordination only in the
context of political communications, not overall activities. The Agen-
cy employs a three-part test, which considers: the Payment Prong,
whether the candidate/campaign or an independent source, in whole
or in part, provided the funds; the Content Prong, whether the
advertisement is expressly tied to a candidate or features campaign-
prepared material; and the Conduct Prong, whether the outside
group and the campaign engaged in particular kinds of interactions
like requesting, suggesting, or discussing the advertisement.158 Each
prong must be satisfied for the government to be successful in
showing unlawful coordination occurred.159
Campaigns and independent groups are predictably careful about
not crossing this line. But because they are “frustrat[ed] at not being
able to coordinate,” they often skillfully test the borders and reveal
“just how narrow [the] line is.”160 Even campaign insiders express
skepticism at the idea that coordination does not occur and consider
the whole system “kind of a farce.”161 The groups sometimes share
office space or staff members, and leadership for “independent”
social welfare groups in recent years looks more and more like a list
of yesterday’s campaign directors, a “revolving door”162 that results
in a “rat’s nest” of political connections.163 According to former
Senator Kent Conrad, a fifteen-year congressional veteran, “[i]f you
look at who makes up these organizations, on all sides, they’re
loaded with political operatives.... So they don’t need to talk to
anybody in the campaign in order to know what to do.”164 Even so,
155. TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 109, at 22.
156. Gerken, supra note 69, at 916.
157. TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 109, at 22.
158. See FEC, supra note 154; see also TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 109, at 21-22.
159. See FEC, supra note 154.
160. TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 109, at 64-65.
161. Id. at 65.
162. Chris Moody, How the GOP Used Twitter to Stretch Election Laws, CNN (Nov. 17,
2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.cnn.com//2014/11/17/politics/twitter-republicans-outside-groups/
index.html [http://perma.cc/2XE4-SZJ8].
163. Gerken, supra note 69, at 916-17; see also Barker, supra note 4.
164. TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 109, at 65.
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staffers of independent groups have been “conditioned” to check
campaign websites, where they can access b-roll (recordings of
candidate messaging), photographs, and talking points through hid-
den links.165
Social media has also begun to play a role. Just two weeks after
the 2014 midterm election, CNN revealed that the National Repub-
lican Congressional Committee used anonymous Twitter accounts
to communicate polling data, an important strategic measure, with
conservative “independent” groups.166 The individual tweets were
deleted every few months, and the accounts were deactivated the
day before the election.167 Outside groups have previously incorpo-
rated information shared via Twitter in their advertisements.168 But
the sharing of polling data for particular districts is unprece-
dented.169
Although it is unclear whether the FEC would consider such be-
havior illegal under the current enforcement regime,170 this conduct
is part of the growing body of evidence that independent groups—so-
cial welfare organizations in particular—do indeed operate as
shadow parties, complete with party elite leadership. These groups
direct party priorities and reflect candidate and campaign messages,
rather than advocate for specific policy issues.171 The emergence of
shadow parties signifies a dangerous institutional shift in power
and political energy.172 As Professor Heather Gerken explains:
Once you understand the hydraulics of party power, once you re-
cognize that party elites will shape-shift in response to changes
in the regulatory environment, you can see that it’s quite easy
to imagine the rise of shadow parties in the wake of Citizens
United. In fact, we already see party elites exercising a great
deal of control over independent-spending organizations. Despite
the formal prohibitions on coordination, the independent Super
165. Id. at 66-67.
166. See Moody, supra note 162. Online anonymity is difficult, as this news report reveals,
but the groups used account names like @TruthTrain14 and @brunogianelli44, appropriating




170. See id.; see also supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
171. See Gerken, supra note 69, at 915-17; Gold, supra note 114.
172. See Gerken, supra note 69, at 912, 919.
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PACs and 501(c)(4)s are intimately interconnected with the real
parties.173
In the past, parties have been able to temper interest groups in
favor of streamlined political goals, acting as the fora where interest
groups could negotiate practical solutions and “reach deals that
allow for governance.”174 Partisan (that is, private-interest) inde-
pendent groups will probably not be capable of following the same
course on their own.
The IRS and the FEC have clearly lost the regulatory game175
when organizations designed for discrete purposes can blur the lines
and operate so closely with one another and with candidates, par-
ties, and campaigns.176 This is not to say that all § 501(c)(4) entities
are falsely created; many legitimate social welfare groups exist and
engage in actual, valuable issue advocacy. But there must be a way
to distinguish the two. Only if the IRS and the FEC work together
will they be able to provide the stricter enforcement necessary to fix
this problem. 
C. Deregulation’s Impact on Values that Support Campaign
Finance Restrictions
Recall the four rationales that underlie campaign finance restric-
tions: the anti-corruption, equality, participation, and information
interests.177 Although the Roberts Court has recognized only quid
pro quo corruption as a sufficient government interest to restrict
political speech,178 the changed landscape in political spending may
require revisiting this judgment. The increase in independent
spending on political advertisements cuts across the values that mo-
tivate campaign finance regulation, the most important of which is
the anti-corruption interest. 
Independent spending does not corrupt in the same way as direct
contributions to a candidate, but as Professor Hasen has explained,
173. Id. at 915.
174. Id. at 919.
175. See infra note 200.
176. See Gerken, supra note 69, at 906, 910-13; Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 62.
177. See supra Part I.B.1.
178. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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“$20 million in a Super PAC supporting Member of Congress X is
less bad (but still bad) than $20 million in Member X’s campaign
account [from that Super PAC].”179 Candidates do not live in a vac-
uum and are aware when support from outside groups, § 501(c)(4)s
or otherwise, assists their political success (or defeat).180 At least one
state supreme court has accepted a systemic-level anti-corruption
principle,181 and Judge Calabresi of the Second Circuit recently
recognized the same.182 As we return to a time of unregulated
political spending, the reemergence of these values is likely to con-
tinue.183 
As Super PACs grow larger and continue coordinating strategy
between social welfare groups and wealthy donors,184 the equality
interest has also become more important. The donor class for the
2012 election was a “select group. The top 100 individual Super PAC
donors ma[d]e up just 3.7% of those who [ ] contributed ... but
account[ed] for more than 80% of the total money raised.”185 The
donors represented a homogenous, business-focused group, many of
whom personally gave more than $1 million.186 Indeed, some can-
didates in the 2012 presidential primaries owed their competitive-
ness to individual donors and outside groups.187 Similarly, an
increase in funds for judicial elections has seen money shift from
candidates to independent groups, which may later impact judicial
decision making.188
Increased independent spending also impacts the participation
and information interests. Because social welfare organizations are
179. Hasen, Progressive Approaches, supra note 69, at 33.
180. See id.
181. See Benson, supra note 49, at 742 (citing Grady v. City of Livingston, 141 P.2d 346
(Mont. 1943)).
182. See Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 197-99 (2d Cir. 2012) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(“[T]he antidistortion interest promotes [free speech rights] in two important ways.”).
183. See Benson, supra note 49, at 741-42. 
184. For a stunning but helpful illustration of the Koch brothers’ political network, see Ctr.
for Responsive Politics, Koch Network, OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/news/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/kochnet.jpg [http://perma.cc/4K85-27SS].




187. See id. 
188. For a full discussion of the impact of Citizens United on judicial elections, see
Erenberg & Berg, supra note 70, at 502.
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not held accountable to the public, they tend to release many more
negative advertisements compared to campaigns or leadership
PACs.189 This can decrease confidence and participation in elec-
tions190 and distort the information the public has about a candi-
date’s message.191 Noting declining voter confidence in his Wisconsin
Right to Life dissent, Justice Souter recognized participation as an
important government interest—an appropriate justification, then,
for the BCRA provisions.192 Justice Stevens later echoed this
sentiment in his Citizens United concurrence.193 
The information interest is most affected by the ambiguous
names § 501(c)(4) groups often choose for themselves.194 For
example, in a Colorado ballot measure, a group called “Littleton
Neighbors Voting No” reported spending $170,000 against a zoning
restriction that would have prevented construction of a new Wal-
Mart store.195 It was later revealed that Wal-Mart itself fully funded
the “Neighbors” coalition.196 This anonymity is quite benefi-
cial—even when a negative advertisement airs, voters tend to be
more receptive and agreeable if the source is an unknown group, or
if donors are not listed.197 Voters rely on cognitive shortcuts, like
which organizations support a candidate, when deciding for whom
189. See Benson, supra note 49, at 741.
190. A 2012 survey conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice reveals this crisis of
confidence: more than 80 percent of those surveyed believed money spent in the 2012 election,
compared with past elections, would lead to more corruption; nearly two-thirds trusted
government less because of the extra money in politics; and more than 25 percent were less
likely to vote because of big-donor influence. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., NATIONAL SURVEY:
SUPER PACS, CORRUPTION, AND DEMOCRACY 1-3 (2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/
analysis/national-survey-super-pacs-corruption-and-democracy [http://perma.cc/XU87-MRW3].
191. See Benson, supra note 49, at 741; see also Gora, supra note 11, at 772; supra notes
7-9 and accompanying text. This Note operates within the current Supreme Court rejection
of the anti-distortion rationale first recognized in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990), but given the changed landscape in just five years after Citizens United,
now is an appropriate time for a renewed call for its recognition as a compelling interest and
sufficient justification for regulation.
192. See WRTL, 551 U.S. 449, 507 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Hence, the second
important consequence of the demand for big money to finance publicity: pervasive public
cynicism.”).
193. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 447-50 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
194. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 64.
195. Id. at 88.
196. Id.
197. Dowling & Wichowsky, supra note 111.
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to cast a ballot.198 But there is a documented impact on voter be-
havior once voters are fully informed about who is behind a political
message, so the importance of rigorously enforcing disclosure
requirements should not be understated.199
All four principles underlying campaign finance regulations are
affected when non-disclosing tax-exempt groups engage in signifi-
cant political activities. The administrative solution proposed in this
Note aims to honor and preserve these values.
III. PROPOSAL: FEC-IRS HYBRID ENFORCEMENT, ENHANCED BY
INTERNAL AGENCY REFORMS
As detailed in Part II, money in politics continues to find new
avenues, leaving regulators to play a game of catch-up.200 The Court
perhaps best described the problem in McConnell v. FEC: “Money,
like water, will always find an outlet.”201 This comparison holds true
more than ever now that § 501(c)(4)s are primed to be some of the
biggest spenders in elections across the nation. Reformers have
typically offered legislative solutions, hoping for a comprehensive
overhaul of the campaign finance system. Even if these revisions are
successful against procedural and judicial hurdles, though, it will be
difficult to create a new statutory scheme that does not open itself
to loopholes and abuse by expedient political actors. Further, while
the statutory debates persist, social welfare organizations continue
to engage in unchecked and sophisticated political operations
capable of evading tax and election laws. Arranging rigorous
enforcement through administrative tweaks and interagency coop-
eration is thus critical to fostering robust and transparent election
dialogue. Working together, each Agency will be emboldened to
fulfill its respective mission and to prevent corruption and exploita-
tion of the electoral and tax systems.
198. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 62-63.
199. See id.
200. See Gerken, supra note 69, at 906-11 (“[Political groups] inevitably [find] loopholes ....
As a result, the entire reform game has been focused on closing those loopholes, engaging in
the regulatory equivalent of whack-a-mole.”).
201. 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003).
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A. Internal Agency Reforms
Although this Note proposes a nuanced fix in the form of inter-
agency regulation of social welfare groups’ political speech, there is
still great need for intra-agency reforms. Regulation of political
activity can improve with precise definitions, influenced by broad
statutory interpretation, and with stricter filing and reporting pro-
cedures. These internal changes, which fall within the regular scope
of agency enforcement, are detailed below. 
1. Filing Requirements
To have a worthwhile chance of regulating political spending by
social welfare organizations, the IRS must strengthen applicable
filing requirements, bringing them more in line with those laid out
in § 527. No application is currently required to operate as a
§ 501(c)(4) organization,202 meaning groups may pop up during
election season and dissolve with no liability. According to Melanie
Sloan, former executive director at Citizens for Responsibility and
Ethics in Washington, this is one of the many problems regulators
face with § 501(c)(4) political activity: “You can go into business and
violate the law and then go out of business .... And what’s ever going
to happen about that? There’s no consequence.”203
The IRS has an easy fix: require an application from any
§ 501(c)(4) group that wishes to engage in political activity. For the
groups that do not submit applications or indicate they will not con-
duct partisan activities but later do (evidenced by FEC filings), the
IRS should impose sanctions to enforce the application requirement,
including reclassification as a § 527 organization or revocation of
exempt status. The current application form is sufficient, and ad-
ministering such a requirement should not be particularly onerous
because the IRS already accepts and reviews applications for tax
exemption. The purpose of this change is simply to bring § 501(c)(4)
political activity under the same regulatory scheme as § 527
political activity. Additionally, if the IRS discovers that a politically
active group has formed and then disbanded during an election
202. See supra Part I.A.
203. Barker, supra note 4.
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cycle, an inquiry is warranted to determine whether the organiza-
tion’s actual purpose was campaign intervention rather than social
welfare. If so, an enforcement action would be appropriate.204
Similar reforms would ensure that the IRS receives more timely
reports about political activity. Even if the IRS required public
disclosures of donors, the current regulations would allow groups to
file such information more than twenty-two months after Election
Day.205 This could be the IRS’s first notice of the existence of a
politically active social welfare organization. The IRS should thus
create rules that require strict and timely reporting like the FEC:
within twenty-four hours of an exempt group’s political expenditure,
the group should notify the IRS. Such notification would close the
timing gap and help the IRS tally political activity by social welfare
organizations as they inch toward the threshold (“primary” or other-
wise) and risk losing § 501(c)(4) status.
2. Earmarked Funds
Unlike the IRS’s facts-and-circumstances methodology used to
determine whether activity is “political,”206 the FEC’s guidelines on
what constitutes political involvement are more sharply drawn. Any
entity that qualifies as a political committee—in the words of the
Court, any group whose “major purpose ... is the nomination or elec-
tion of a candidate” and whose activity is “by definition, campaign
related”207—must register with the FEC and report contributions
and expenditures over $1000.208 This bright-line rule, however, is
not without fault. As a preliminary matter, any social welfare
organization that registers under this scheme risks a hefty tax bill
because admitting it has the major purpose of impacting an election,
such as when its activity very closely resembles that of traditional
204. Of course, the IRS must require more than evidence of mere coincidental timing. In
addition to the length of time between creation and dissolution, and how that timing compares
to the election cycle (perhaps defined by candidate activity), regulators should consider
analysis of reported spending, number and identity of donors, and engagement in nonpartisan
activity. These suggestions are not exhaustive and other factors will likely be relevant, but
developing a comprehensive list is beyond the scope of this Note. 
205. See Tobin, supra note 28.
206. See supra Part II.A.2.
207. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
208. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(a) (2012).
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political actors, likely means conceding that social welfare activities
are not its primary purpose.
Further, for each electioneering communication and independent
expenditure, regardless of whether the spender (in other words, the
speaker) is a registered organization, the FEC requires disclosures
only for earmarked donations—those given for the purpose of the
communication or expenditure.209 It is easy for organizations to
avoid disclosure, then, even with this seemingly well-delineated
rule. First, many donors to social welfare groups give unrestricted
amounts—funds for the organization’s general budget rather than
earmarked for a specific purpose.210 Second, independent expendi-
tures are still subject to the strict “magic words” test (“vote for
[X]”),211 and political advertisements are considered electioneering
communications only in limited circumstances.212 
BCRA makes no mention of earmarked funds, so the FEC rules
represent a very narrow reading of the statute.213 The FEC should
thus broaden its administrative understanding of the statute to
cover more funds—those actually used for political involvement,
rather than only those intended for such activity. This wider
perspective would trigger more complete reporting for all politically
active organizations, regardless of tax status.214 
The IRS should also independently address this problem by
taking the opposite approach and imposing an earmark rule. By
requiring social welfare organizations to pay for political activity
with funds specifically earmarked for such a purpose, the IRS can
help prevent circumvention of FEC requirements (should they stay
the same) and align tax-exempt activities and reporting with
congressional intent. With this rule, if an organization were not able
to raise designated funds, it could not legally engage in any political
activity. This stricter accounting would facilitate more accurate FEC
disclosures and assist the IRS in determining whether the group is
“primarily” organized for social welfare.
209. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 63, 71, 73 n.68, 75.
210. See id. at 73.
211. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52; 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a).
212. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a); see also Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 63.
213. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 37, at 73.
214. See id.
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3. Combatting the Daisy Chain Effect
Even when the disclosures they receive are consistent, the IRS
and FEC should remain watchful in order to combat obscured dis-
closures made possible by the daisy chain effect. A classic example
of the daisy chain effect in action is the Center to Protect Patient
Rights, which spent 75 percent of its budget (more than $44 million)
on contributions to other politically active tax-exempt groups.215
When organizations act as conduits, tracking donations becomes
much more difficult. Under the current regime, social welfare organ-
izations can report donations from similar groups without mention
of the original donor.216 If a § 527 or § 501(c)(4) organization reports
contributions from other social welfare groups, the IRS should
require the reporting organization—the last in the chain—to dis-
close donation history so that the money is traceable to the original
source. This process adds some procedural burdens (for exempt
entities rather than the IRS), but it is not too severe a requirement
for § 501(c)(4) organizations that engage in political activity. Such
an obligation mirrors the strict accounting expected of § 527 groups
for their political activity and serves the same functions,217 bringing
into agreement how political activity is treated across exempt
organizations. This area of regulation in particular also lends itself
well to interagency regulation—that is, cooperation between the
FEC and the IRS.
B. Cooperative Regulation: Pooling Together Tax & Election
Enforcement Powers
The internal changes discussed above are important steps in im-
proving enforcement of the laws relating to politically active social
welfare organizations. Perhaps more important, though, is for the
Agencies to provide a unified front against entities that do not
follow the restrictions of their exempt, politically active status. The
FEC oversees the financing of elections,218 and the IRS, the effective
215. See Barker, supra note 4.
216. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
217. See supra Part I.A.2.
218. See supra note 3.
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administration of the tax code.219 These seemingly distinct areas
overlap when tax-exempt organizations engage in political activity,
and this intersection necessitates something more complex than
independent regulation. The Agencies thus must work together,
combining their respective powers to accomplish their separate but
interrelated missions. 
Professor Daphna Renan’s recent work is particularly informative
as to how this regulation can legally and functionally take shape. As
she explains, “pooling” is the process of two or more agencies
working together, which is neither required nor prohibited by
statute, nor limited to instances of designated overlap.220 The
purpose of pooling is to take advantage of agencies’ diverse special-
ized expertise, authorization, or abilities in certain areas and
“create regulatory power that would not otherwise exist.”221 Though
pooling is not limitless—statutory, political, and institutional
constraints still apply—agencies may undertake pooling on their
own.222 As policy priorities evolve, and regulatory challenges become
more interconnected, pooling has become a desirable solution.223
Prompt administrative action, particularly in the form of pooling, is
more responsive than legislative solutions to the flexibility this and
other areas of regulation demand.224
Pooling is perhaps most common when one agency has the
resources and institutional knowledge, but not the legal authority,
to address a particular issue, and another agency, lacking in exper-
tise, has the legal grant of power.225 The D.C. Circuit has ratified
such arrangements, where the agencies “have complementary roles”
and the statute does not forbid coordination.226 Such is the situation
here, where the IRS has the statutory grant to regulate tax-exempt
entities but lacks exact knowledge of the electoral system. The FEC,
219. The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-
Agency-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority [http://perma.cc/T7ZR-5SRN] (last updated Jan.
23, 2015).
220. See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 214, 216, 219 (2015).
221. Id. at 217.
222. See id. at 218.
223. See id. at 234-35.
224. See supra Parts II.A-B.
225. See Renan, supra note 220, at 223.
226. Id. at 270-71 (citing Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 247, 249 (D.C. Cir.
2014)).
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on the other hand, possesses institutional expertise and the grant
to regulate political behavior, but cannot competently regulate
issues of tax exemption. The IRS and the FEC thus will be most
adept at regulating political speech by social welfare organizations
only by engaging in pooling. 
As the agency tasked with managing and administering the
nation’s elections, the FEC is perhaps the obvious regulatory entity
of choice—the problems presented in this Note, after all, center on
political involvement. But because social welfare organizations can
avoid FEC reporting requirements, and simultaneously shirk tax
responsibility, the Agency has “only part of the equation”227 needed
to solve the crisis. IRS participation in this regulation is also
appropriate—and virtually unavoidable—because tax-exempt status
dictates at what level, if at all, a group can participate in political
activity.228 Congress understands this to be true: thirteen senators
have urged the IRS to adopt stricter limits on outside spending from
social welfare groups, finding that the current “primary” purpose
rule diverges from the language of the statute, which would demand
an “insubstantial” amount of political activity.229 Ultimately, robust
enforcement in this area will require a cooperative approach.
These Agencies are institutionally and structurally incapable of
regulating this behavior on their own. The FEC suffers from perpet-
ual structural gridlock.230 Functionally flawed at its core—six com-
missioners, three from each of the two major parties—it is beyond
difficult to get the four votes needed for an administrative ruling.231
227. Palmer Gibbs, Transparency Advocates Look at “The Price We Pay for Money’s Influ-




228. See The Restriction of Political Campaign Intervention by Section 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt
Organizations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/
The-Restriction-of-Political-Campaign-Intervention-by-Section-501(c)(3)-Tax-Exempt-
Organizations [http://perma.cc/4QM2-PGVW] (last updated Jan. 6, 2015).
229. See Paul Blumenthal, Democrats Push IRS to Limit Dark Money’s Political Power with
Strict New Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/02/27/dark-money-rules_n_4867534.html [http://perma.cc/2LBG-FKTU]. Under that
standard, Rosenberg’s Rules, supra note 83, indicate that 5 to 15 percent of an organization’s
activity would be an acceptable threshold, rather than nearly 50 percent. 
230. See Goodman, supra note 62.
231. See id.
380 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:341
Even Justices typically in favor of loose campaign restrictions have
recognized the imperative need for, and constitutionality of,
vigorous disclosure.232 Yet the FEC ended in a 3-3 standstill in a
recent request to shield a donor list from disclosure, failing to
provide any clear guidance to the requestor.233 This fundamental
disagreement plagues the FEC, consistently reducing its productiv-
ity.234 Even Congress, not exactly known for its efficiency,235 has lost
respect for the FEC—despite the FEC’s countless demands for
electronic filing, something on which both major parties can agree,
the Senate refuses to amend internal rules that would allow it to
comply with this request.236
The IRS has faced similar challenges. In 2013, it became em-
broiled in a scandal when evidence surfaced that it had directed
extra attention toward social welfare organizations associated with
the Tea Party movement.237 Sources revealed that the IRS had de-
nied exempt status to certain groups that applied under § 501(c)(4),
and conducted rigorous audits of existing groups, usually hand-
picked by name (when indicating Tea Party affiliation).238 The IRS
has since exhibited a general unwillingness to bring enforcement
actions against tax-exempt groups for their political activities,
engaging in an unofficial avoidance policy. Treasury oversight was
pronounced “at best overzealous, at worst partisan,” only deepening
232. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010) (“Disclaimer and disclosure
requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they impose no ceiling on campaign-related
activities, and do not prevent anyone from speaking.”); id. at 369 (“[T]he public has an interest
in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election.”); Doe v. Reed, 561
U.S. 186, 228 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Requiring people to stand up in public for their
political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed.”).
233. See Peter Overby, FEC: Tea Party May Not Shield Donors, NPR (Nov. 22, 2013, 4:33
AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/22/246665788/fec-tea-party-cant-shield-donors [http://perma.
cc/ YX76-JA5H].
234. See id. Consider, in the mid-2000s, before Wisconsin Right to Life and Citizens United,
the FEC voted on more than 1000 enforcement matters each year. Goodman, supra note 62.
Since 2010, that has decreased to fewer than 200 per year. Id.
235. See David Sherfinski, 113th Congress Narrowly Avoids “Least Productive” Status:
Report, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/29/pew-
113th-congress-narrowly-avoids-least-productiv/ [http://perma.cc/3BHE-GWYR].
236. See Overby, supra note 233.
237. See Goodman, supra note 62.
238. See id.; Andy Kroll, The IRS Tea Party Scandal, Explained, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 21,
2013, 1:19 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/irs-tea-party-scandal-congress-
nonprofit-obama [http://perma.cc/99H7-V5LF].
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this reluctance.239 The IRS now rarely initiates enforcement actions,
even against exempt groups that clearly violate their tax-exempt
status,240 and moots any litigation resulting from its action by re-
funding all levied fines or reinstating revoked exempt status.241
Given its essential purpose of revenue collection, the IRS likely will
not, on its own, make this regulation a priority, because it involves
complicated enforcement of nonprofit groups (from which little reve-
nue is collected).242
Though some may still feel the fallout from the scandal, the
record-high independent spending in the 2014 midterms243and the
nearly 100 candidate-related outside groups already formed for the
2016 presidential election244 signify that it is time for the IRS to
come forward and enforce its existing regulations. Timidity is argu-
ably what led to the situation surrounding the scandal and made
the IRS vulnerable to attack.245 In the wake of Citizens United, the
IRS should have established useful precedent by issuing guidance
about acceptable activities and reclassifying all delinquent organi-
zations.246 It can follow this path now by pooling its resources and
relevant expertise with the FEC’s to create an appropriately forceful
regulatory environment.
The Agencies are functioning poorly without support from one
another, but the powers they do have complement each other well
in this area. As discussed in Part II.B, the figures reported in FEC
and IRS filings often conflict. The inconsistency lies largely at the
center of the definitional problem created by the deficient guidance
239. Goodman, supra note 62.
240. Some have suggested the IRS could employ the private benefit doctrine to bring
enforcement actions against § 501(c)(4) groups that are organized for the special interests of
a few wealthy donors, rather than for “social welfare” purposes. See, e.g., Dougherty, supra
note 78, at 1342; Hasen, Danger, supra note 69.
241. See, e.g., Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1185 (11th Cir.
2011) (dismissing for mootness).
242. See Colinvaux, supra note 74, at 46.
243. See Derek Willis, Outside Groups Set Spending Record in Midterms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
11, 2014, at A3; supra Part II.B.1.
244. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2016 Presidential Race, Behind the Candidates: Cam-
paign Committees and Outside Groups, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/
outside groups.php [http://perma.cc/6L3E-US2K] (last updated Oct. 5, 2015, 7:00 PM) (indi-
cating the formation of ninety-six outside groups supporting declared presidential candidates,
including six § 501(c)(4) organizations).
245. See Colinvaux, supra note 74, at 46.
246. See id.
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found in the IRS Revenue Rulings and by its case-by-case approach,
as well as the FEC’s constricted interpretation of BCRA’s reporting
requirements.247 Without well-defined guidelines, § 501(c)(4) groups
can frame communications as issue advocacy—rather than express
advocacy—and therefore avoid the IRS political activity threshold
and the FEC disclosure requirements.248 Because the FEC regula-
tions are clearer, groups often report higher political spending fig-
ures to the FEC than they do to the IRS.249 The 2013 IRS-proposed
rules represent one step forward toward an improved enforcement
regime, but the proposal lacks meaningful changes and thus
remains inadequate.250 Election activities are not always easily
distinguishable from actual issue-based actions,251 but by creating
more clearly defined standards, the IRS will be able to protect itself
and social welfare groups that wish to engage in legitimate issue
advocacy. The FEC’s expertise in crafting rules about political ac-
tivity should contribute to this venture significantly. Pooling their
respective skills to craft a unified definition of political activity will
also help ensure the Agencies receive accurate and consistent
reports.252
Both the IRS and FEC reporting schemes incentivize social
welfare organizations to minimize (that is, incorrectly categorize)
political activities, so the Agencies must be guarded when evaluat-
ing reports of political spending. Unlike § 527 groups, the tax-
exempt status of social welfare organizations hinges on a threshold
determination—that their “primary” activity supports the social
247. See Galston, supra note 12, at 890; see also supra Parts II.A, II.B.2.
248. This is a legitimate concern given how imprecise the Rulings are regarding what is
issue advocacy versus political activity. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., Robert Maguire & Viveca Novak, Shadow Money Magic: Five Easy Steps that
Let You Play Big in Politics, Hide Your Donors and Game the IRS—Step 2, OPENSECRETS
(Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/04/shadow-money-magic-five-easy-
steps-1/ [http://perma.cc/5WH7-G8UF].
250. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
251. In the ninety-day comment period, the IRS received over 140,000 comments, most of
them negative. Gerken, Gibson, & Lyons, supra note 97. 
252. The IRS was scheduled to release the revised version of its disastrous 2013 rule earlier
this year. Pooling would strengthen this effort, but the Agency has at least suggested it is
considering uniform application of the “political activity” definition to all politically active
exempt entities. See Flynn & Bade, supra note 25.
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welfare.253 The FEC collects information crucial to this determin-
ation—information about independent political expenditures, in-
cluding what the money was spent on, where, and by whom.254 The
IRS should regularly consult FEC filings to determine whether
exempt organizations are adequately conforming to their prescribed
purpose. This will no doubt impose some institutional burden on the
IRS, but since these reports are readily available online to members
of the public, ensuring accurate filings does not even require formal
agency coordination. More importantly, though, this measure
greatly furthers the IRS’s successful enforcement of the tax code, a
task it is commanded to undertake. 
By adopting clearer and more streamlined definitions, the FEC
and the IRS will be able to ensure political expenditures are brought
in to the regulatory scheme designed to capture them. Developing
a precise definition of what constitutes political activity will be
essential to this cooperative effort. Even with a narrow definition,
though, the Agencies should work together to determine which
groups are engaging in what type of political activity (and how
much), and whether those organizations have satisfactorily reported
those activities. 
CONCLUSION
This Note aims to provide an alternative solution to issues in the
current campaign finance landscape regarding the increased in-
volvement of social welfare organizations. Comprehensive legisla-
tive reform may at some point be necessary to fixing the campaign
finance challenges highlighted herein, but much can be done in the
regulatory space. Improving the reticent climate of agency avoid-
ance and empowering the IRS and the FEC to create valuable, effec-
tive, and constitutional255 enforcement mechanisms is an equally
beneficial, if not preferable, response to the rise in independent
spending and of § 501(c)(4) political involvement.
253. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2014). As a general matter, FEC registration categorically
excludes social welfare organizations because a § 501(c)(4) group’s “primary” purpose cannot
be election intervention. See Tobin, supra note 28. 
254. See Barker, supra note 4.
255. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Many scholars expect no meaningful reform will come until a
scandal emerges.256 However, instituting the proposed internal
reforms and engaging in cooperative action now provides a powerful,
and likely more expedient, resolution. Most importantly, following
such a path establishes a blueprint for stringent enforcement,
ensuring that any later legislative reforms are operable and that
regulators are not again trapped playing a game of catch-up. There
is great danger in waiting for scandal, as non-enforcement leaves
open the possibility of tax code and election law abuses, and allows
more undisclosed money in politics. As Paul S. Ryan, senior counsel
for the Campaign Legal Center, has explained, without rigorous
enforcement, “[t]he political players who are soliciting these funds
and are benefiting from ... these funds will know where the money
came from. The only ones in the dark will be American voters.”257 
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